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The article analyzes the legal-political aspects of the concept of hakimiyya (“divine 
domination”) devised by the Indo-Pakistani theologian Abul A‘la Mawdudi (1903–1979). 
The author asserts that the doctrine of hakimiyya is based upon the recognition that Allah 
is the sole subject empowered to provide legislation to the Muslim community directly (the 
principle of “legal domination”) and indirectly (the principle of “political domination”).The 
doctrine of hakimiyya acquires its political shape as the Islamic state (caliphate), wherein the 
Islamic community is entrusted with a limited right to legislation by means of agency (wikala). 
Special emphasis is laid on examination into the critical appraisal of the hakimiyya doctrinals 
in the modern Islamic legal science. The article explores the objections raised against the 
hakimiyya theory by the Indo-Pakistani religious scholars, including Abul Hasan Nadwi and 
Wahid al-Din Khan, as well as by a number of modern Arabic legal theorists, such as Hasan al-
Hudaybi, Muhammad ‘Imara, Muhammad Sayyid al-‘Ashmawi, Haydar Ibrahim ‘Ali a.o. The 
author concludes that the concept of hakimiyya underlies Mawdudi’s doctrine of the sources 
of law and serves as the basis for his theory of the Islamic state, as well as for his concept of the 
“renewal of faith” through Islamic revolution.
Keywords: hakimiyya, legal domination, political domination, caliphate, din, Islamic state. 
1. Introduction. Abul A‘la Mawdudi (further referred to as Mawdudi) has long been 
considered one of the most influential theorists of Islamic law of the twentieth century. 
Mawdudi’s legal-political doctrine has exerted considerable influence on the current state 
of the Islamic socio-political thought, with its fundamentals remaining at the center of 
acute scientific debates in Islamic academia. Of all the various theories introduced by 
Mawdudi into the Islamic legal thought, it is the doctrine of “divine domination” (hakimi-
yya ilahiyya) that deserves the most special attention. So far the conceptual foundations of 
hakimiyya have not been subject to close examination on the part of the Russian research-
ers in the field of Islamic legal studies. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of 
hakimiyya was developed in the 1930s, it continues to remain a cornerstone of multiple 
Islamic political theories, such as Qutbism, “Islamic quietism”, and numerous other forms 
of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism. The present article aims at analyzing the essen-
tial features of hakimiyya — the theory which, this author believes, constitutes the most 
important innovation in Mawdudi’s entire intellectual output. After discussing the fun-
damentals of hakimiyya, special emphasis will be laid on the academic debates that have 
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been taking place among the Islamic legal scholars about the extent to which this concept 
corresponds to the basic tenets of Islamic faith and law. 
2. Main text. At the core of the theory of hakimiyya lies the assumption that Islam, 
unlike other world religions, should not be regarded as a mere aggregate comprising di-
verse theological concepts and ritual practices, but rather that it should be looked upon 
as, what Mawdudi liked to call it, a “political system” (nizam siyasi). In his seminal lecture 
delivered in Lahore in 1939 he stated the following: “First, we should clearly understand 
and always be sensible of the fact that Islam is not just a huddle of unrelated theories and 
various ways of conduct. It is rather a perfect, comprehensive system resting on a set of 
rational, thoroughly formulated principles. This system is logically connected to these 
principles from its important fundamentals up to minor unessential details” (al-Mawdudi 
1967, 7). It is thus distinctive of the “political system” of Islam that it is rooted in axiomati-
cal concepts derived directly from the Qur’anic revelation rather than from the secondary 
(also known as “rational”) sources of Islamic law. 
The priority role of the Qur’an in formulating the basic principles of the “political 
system” of Islam manifests itself precisely in Mawdudi’s negative attitude towards the clas-
sical exegetic literature. Mawdudi believed that the genuine meanings of all the most cru-
cial political terms of the Qur’an had historically been undergoing a gradual, although 
hardly noticeable, process of transformation, up until the point at which they had begun 
to denote only narrow and quite indefinite notions. This development eventually resulted 
in a situation where in the later dictionaries and commentaries the terms of the original 
Qur’anic vocabulary began to be interpreted solely according to their then-contemporary 
meanings. In addition, Mawdudi tended to think of the classical era legists and theolo-
gians as unable to differentiate between the absolute atemporal principles of Islam and 
their particular spatially and temporarily determined manifestations. From his stand-
point, any attempts at interpreting the Qur’anic revelation exclusively on the basis of one’s 
understanding of the needs of the moment would be doomed to failure from the start. 
Inasmuch as Islam embodies the idea of freedom of will, it is only by means of inde-
pendent and unmediated study that a man can understand the true implications of the 
Qur’anic revelation. “Man has been endowed with reason and intellect. He has the power 
to think and form judgments, to choose and reject, and to adopt and spurn. He is free to 
adopt whatever course of life he chooses. He can embrace any faith, adopt any way of life 
and formulate his living according to whatever ideologies he likes… He has been bestowed 
with free will and can chalk out his own course of behavior” (Maududi 1960b, 4). Since 
man exercises unrestricted free will, it is natural for the Supreme Lawgiver to confine 
himself to defining only the most imperative principles of Islam, making room for a man 
to act independently beyond the restrictions imposed upon him. “The Qur’an, to put it 
succinctly, is a Book of broad general principles rather than of legal minutiae. The Book’s 
main aim is to expound, clearly and adequately, the intellectual and moral foundations 
of the Islamic programme for life… Its method of guidance for practical Islamic life does 
not consist of laying down minutely detailed laws and regulations. It prefers to outline 
the basic framework for each aspect of human activity and to lay down certain guidelines 
within which man can order his life in keeping with the Will of God” (Mawdudi 1988, 28). 
The ideological core of the “political system” of Islam is made up of the so-called “four 
Qur’anic terms”, which may be deduced directly from the text of the revelation. These 
terms include 1) rabb (“Master”, or “Lord”); 2) ilah (“deity”), and its synonym ma‘bud (“an 
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object of worship”); 3) ‘ibada (“worship”); 4) din (“faith”, “religion”). Mawdudi reckoned 
that whosoever made more than a perfunctory inquiry into the teachings of the Qur’an 
would soon realize that its entire contents revolved around these four terms only (al-
Mawdudi 1971, 7), and that for the Islamic ideology to be comprehended properly it was 
essential to fully grasp their respective meanings. It is therefore noteworthy that, in the 
words of J.-P. Hartung, “although Mawdudi’s first two terms refer to the Qur’anic concept 
of God, the fundamental doctrine of tawhid seems to have played only an implicit role 
[in his theory. — P. V.]” (Hartung 2014, 91). Having excluded tawhid, which he defined as 
faith in the unity of Allah in its broadest sense1, from the fundamental political terms of 
the Qur’an, he nevertheless claimed that failure to comprehend the true implications of 
tawhid would amount to one’s inability to tell it from shirk.
The word rabb is supposed to convey the active aspect of the divinity of Allah (rubu-
biyya), which manifests itself in the upbringing of man, instilling in him the fervor of 
piousness, and, last but not least, in the institution of the unrestricted divine domination 
over the entire humankind. In “The Four Terms in the Qur’an” Mawdudi boldly states that 
“the term “supremacy” (al-rububiyya) is used in the Qur’an as an equivalent to the term 
“domination” (al-hakimiyya wa-l-malakiyya), with the Qur’anic description of the “Mas-
ter” (al-rabb) being that of the “absolute ruler” (al-hakim al-mutlaq), the king, and the 
uncontested overlord of all things in existence (al-Mawdudi 1971, 93). Correspondingly, 
the violation of rububiyya would, from Mawdudi’s standpoint, equal to the ascription of 
associates to Allah, and, moreover, it would ultimately result in man vesting himself with 
the right to set his own rules of conduct.
As contrasted to rububiyya, the purpose of the term ilah is to reflect the passive aspect 
of the divinity of Allah (uluhiyya), namely the fact that it is only Allah to whom, as the 
sole object of worship (ma‘bud), the attributes of divinity are allotted. Once again, it is the 
idea of Allah’s absolute authority over the entire mankind that appears to be at the core 
of Mawdudi’s understanding of uluhiyya. “The essence of uluhiyya is, generally speaking, 
authority (al-sulta) accepted by the mankind either in view of the fact that it preserves 
the laws of nature, or because its dictates hold sway over a man in his earthly life” (al-
Mawdudi 1971, 23). According to Mawdudi, “the meaning of ilah is the object of worship 
(ma‘bud), and this object of worship is worth worshipping (al-‘ibada); this worship doesn’t 
only comprise customs and rituals — the entire life the worshipper (‘abd, lit. “slave”) leads 
is nothing but “slavery” (‘ubudiyya) and worship” (al-Mawdudi 1967, 12). This true wor-
ship of Allah is directly set off against the false worship of that which is known as “the 
idol” (taghut) in the traditional Qur’anic phraseology. “In the sense in which it is used in 
the Qur’an, it [i.e. the term taghut. — P. V.] denotes a person who transgresses the limits 
prescribed by his status as a creation of God, who sets himself up as a god and makes the 
people treat him as such” (Maududi 1955, 2). Taghut represents the extreme form of dis-
obedience to divine authority: “not only does he rebel against God, denying Him and His 
right to lay down the law for man, but also begins to make his own law to prevail in the 
land” (Maududi 1955, 2), making his personality a focal point for numerous other forms 
of resistance to divine authority, such as lechery (fisq) and kufr2. In short, in Mawdudi’s 
1 In Islamic theology and law, tawhid refers to the notion of the oneness of God, as opposed to different 
kinds of polytheism (shirk). 
2 According to the English researcher F. Grare, for Mawdudi, “to acknowledge any other entity 
[besides Allah. — P. V.] as being sovereign or to accept any principle of authority is equivalent to idolatry” 
(Grare 2011, 166). 
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opinion, to worship taghut is to be under the sway of everything this term denotes, in-
cluding “any state, any power and any leadership willing to encroach upon Allah, to rebel 
against him and to impose its authority in lieu of the authority of Allah” (al-Mawdudi 
1971, 101).
Of all the four terms that serve as the basis for Mawdudi’s ideological system, din, 
viewed as the “all-embracing way of comprehension and action in the life of man” (al-
Mawdudi 1988, 13), is probably the most complex and sophisticated one. As J.-P. Hartung 
justly points out, “the Qur’anic term ‘din’ constitutes the glue which ties Mawdudi’s other 
three fundamental Qur’anic terms together. It justifies ‘ibada out of the acknowledgment 
of God’s ultimate authority as rabb and ilah” (Hartung 2014, 96). In the eyes of Mawdudi, 
the aim of din is to point to the universal “system of life” which man is free to choose for 
himself voluntarily in accordance with the Qur’anic concept of free will. Mawdudi defines 
din as “the law” (al-qanun), “the resolutions” (al-hudud), and “the way” (al-shar‘ wa-l-
tariqa) that jointly make up “the philosophical and practical system the man is guided 
by” (al-Mawdudi 1971, 125). Despite the fact that man is free to choose between all the 
existing “systems of life”, it is only the religion of Allah (din allah) that fully corresponds 
to the laws of nature by virtue of its being based on the principles of the “political sys-
tem” of Islam. Nature appears to be the boundary line drawn between Islam on the one 
hand and jahiliyya3 and shirk on the other. “As for the non-din systems, the ones based on 
submission to authority (al-sulta) other than Allah, He rejects them, and it is not natu-
ral that He should like them” (al-Mawdudi 1971, 129). In the words of Mawdudi, “if the 
authority owes itself to the commandments of a monarch, then the person concerned is 
in the monarch’s din (fi din al-malik), if some sheikhs or priests prescribe it, then he fol-
lows their din… Long story short, the decisive factor as to the din the person follows is he 
whose orders he deems utmost and whose judgments — final” (al-Mawdudi 1971, 125). 
Din ultimately acquires the status of a universal, all-around “system of life” in its ideologi-
cal, philosophical, moral and practical dimensions (Qadi 1987, 152), making Mawdudi 
conclude that it approximates the notion of “state” in the Western European legal-political 
discourse (Jackson 2011, 128). “There is perhaps no term in any language of the world 
which would be of such a universal comprehensiveness as to fully embrace the notion of 
a din. The word “state” does, to some extent, approximate to the sense, but even this word 
is to be substantially extended in terms of its meaning in order to embrace the notion of 
din” (al-Mawdudi 1971, 127).
It appears that, in defining din, Mawdudi was influenced to no small degree by the 
views on the interrelation between religion, Shari‘ah and nature expounded by Qutb al-
Din Ahmad Dihlawi (1703–1762), an Indian faqih better known as Shah Wali Allah of 
Delhi, in his treatise entitled “The Conclusive Argument from Allah”. As R. Jackson ob-
serves, Shah Wali Allah “developed a theory of the relationship between revelation and 
its socio-historical context by arguing that the ideal form of din (which he interprets to 
mean primordial ideal religion) is synonymous with the ideal form of nature” (Jackson 
2011, 115). Shah Wali Allah believed that notions of genuine, natural religion (din) had 
been historically actualized through the succession of divine revelations presented to the 
3 In the historic Islamic literature, jahiliyya denotes the totality of various customs and rules of 
conduct peculiar to the pagan tribes of Arabia before the advent of Islam. As for Mawdudi, he utilizes the 
term in his writings to refer to the political dimension of polytheism, which manifests itself in the shape of 
various un-Islamic ideologies, forms of government and political regimes
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mankind depending on its prevailing socio-political conditions. Although inalterable and 
universal in its essence, din tended to take the shape of specific legal and religious injunc-
tions, known as Shari‘ah, in conformity with the customs and everyday practices of the 
society the divine revelation was about to be sent down to. “And know that the legal provi-
sions (shara’i‘) of the prophets, peace be upon them, differed for [known] reasons and for 
the good of mankind, namely because the signs of Allah (sha‘a’ir) had been given only to 
those ready to accept them, as well as because, in order to decide the fate of the mankind, 
multiple customs and conditions had to be taken into consideration” (Dihlawi 1933, 89). 
Both the active (rububiyya) and the passive (uluhiyya) aspects of Allah’s divinity 
manifest themselves through the so-called “divine domination” (hakimiyya) over the hu-
man world. This domination essentially amounts to an unlimited divine authority over 
the humankind and constitutes what can be termed Allah’s legal right to legislature as 
opposed to the unconditional obedience to his authority and ordinances (ubudiyya) man 
is expected to show. From Mawdudi’s perspective “in Islam, it is Allah to whom alone ha-
kimiyya belongs. The Qur’an accurately clarifies the ideology of tawhid by pointing to the 
fact that it is only Allah who has no associates not only in terms of religion but also from 
the political and legal standpoint… Verily, with regard to Islamic ideology, it is Allah the 
Almighty alone who himself (bi-thatihi wa aslihi) is the ruler. As for any other authority, it 
is deemed shared and prohibited” (al-Mawdudi 1980, 81–82). Mawdudi believes that “the 
foundation of the entire political theory of Islam rests upon the idea that both the execu-
tive and legislative powers should be snatched out of people’s hands at individual and col-
lective levels so that no man could neither exercise his authority (an yunaffitha amrahu) 
over other men, nor legislate for them. Verily this [right] belongs to Allah alone, and there 
are no associates to him in exercising it” (al-Mawdudi 1967, 27). 
It is possible to conditionally classify the “divine domination” into the absolute, or le-
gal, domination (hakimiyya qanuniyya), and the factual, or political, domination (hakimi-
yya siyasiyya). Speaking on the essence of the “legal domination”, Mawdudi pointed out 
that the expression was commonly used to denote Allah’s supreme legislative authority. 
To reject this authority meant, in his eyes, to openly admit to being infidel (kufr). “Islam 
has decided the issue of the legal domination by vesting the right to dominate exclusively 
in Allah the Almighty, whose factual domination is the sole basis of this Universe, and 
to whom belongs the uncontestable right to dominate over the entire mankind… This is 
what has been clarified by the Qur’anic formula… “judgment belongs to Allah alone”… 
From the Qur’anic standpoint, it is outright kufr to deny him his right to dominate: “And 
whoso judges not by that which Allah has sent down, these it is who are the disbeliev-
ers” (al-Mawdudi 1981, 23). On another occasion, Mawdudi stated as follows: “The Holy 
Qur’an has made it incumbent upon the mankind to obey Allah sincerely and to observe 
the laws given by Him alone, while at the same time man has been prohibited from disre-
garding His laws in favor of other laws, as well as of his own laws and whims” (al-Mawdudi 
1978, 13). 
Apparently, it was Mawdudi’s rendition of the Qur’anic term rabb and its derivative 
rububiyya that predominantly determined his view of Allah as the subject of “legal domi-
nation”. Since the only creator of the world was rabb, Mawdudi used rabb and hakim as 
interchangeable terms, applying the latter to the subject of hakimiyya. Still Mawdudi was 
clearly aware of the fact that it was impossible to identify rububiyya with hakimiyya fully, 
and that is what eventually made him regard rububiyya as the substantive element of Al-
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lah’s being, as opposed to hakimiyya, which, according to him, had to be looked upon 
as the manifestation of rububiyya in the physical world. “For Mawdudi, the prime func-
tion of the Creator, after calling the universe into being, was to issue rules and regula-
tions for its functioning so that sovereignty thus became largely identical with legislative 
force, which is why Mawdudi spoke of God’s sovereignty as “legal sovereignty” (Hartung 
2014, 102). Yet, since din was, in Mawdudi’s view, a “system of life” one was free to choose 
without any compulsion, there was no reason to treat “legal domination” as absolute and 
unconditional.
As in “legal domination”, “political domination”, which Mawdudi defines as “the con-
trol over political power established in order for the “legal domination” to take its [due] 
place” (al-Mawdudi 1981, 19), is the prerogative reserved exclusively to Allah, but, unlike 
“legal domination”, it is supposed to operate directly in the physical world by means of the 
so-called “agency” (wikala), or rather “divine deputyship” (caliphate). “In the language of 
politics and law, there is no way to say that any one agency with ambitions to execute ha-
kimiyya by making use of political force is the true subject of domination; it is evident that 
no such agency could be the bearer of hakimiyya since it is not entitled to legal domina-
tion. Its authority is circumscribed by the law it has no power to alter…Therefore, we can 
see that the Qur’an applies the term “caliphate” to describe this force, that is to say, neither 
this force nor this authority exercise supreme rule, for they are nothing but the deputy of 
the supreme ruler — Allah the Mighty and Majestic” (al-Mawdudi 1981, 24).
The concept of hakimiyya is undoubtedly the cornerstone of Mawdudi’s entire legal 
political theory. In the apt expression of Muhammad ‘Imara, “hakimiyya serves as the key 
to understanding Mawdudi. We will not be able to appreciate the “novelty” of his ideas as 
against the ideas of his predecessors from among the leading figures of the Islamic awak-
ening unless we fully grasp his concept of hakimiyya” (‘Imara 2011, 130). From the begin-
ning the concept has been met with mixed feelings on the part of various Islamic political 
thinkers, remaining a matter of intensive scientific debates to this very day.
In 1963, Wahid al-Din Khan (b. 1925), a renowned Indian faqih, published his book 
“Error in Interpretation”, in which he subjected the theological foundations of hakimiyya 
to sharp criticism. According to the Canadian researcher ‘Asif Iftikar, “Khan’s book rep-
resents one of the first comprehensive and serious intellectual challenges to Mawdudi’s 
religious thought and is especially important as it comes from within the ranks of Jama‘at-i 
Islami” (Iftikar 2004, 29). As the scholar notes, Wahid al-Din Khan believed that Mawdudi 
had dramatically departed from the traditional interpretation of the “four terms”, especial-
ly the term din, which he completely redefined in order to lay the foundation of his overall 
concept of religion and state (Iftikar 2004, 29). From Wahid al-Din Khan’s perspective, 
despite the fact that din was indeed the pivotal concept of Islam, it was nevertheless wrong 
to claim that it could be used to denote the Islamic “way of life” in its political and legal 
dimensions since the concept was utilized in the Qur’an solely to reflect the spiritual bond 
between man and Allah. “Being a means for us to understand all the aspects of [Islamic] 
religion in keeping with the overall Islamic history, the true concept of din signifies, in its 
fundamental essence, the establishment of a kind of relationship between man and Allah 
that is based on fear, love and hope, with worship (‘ibada) being an essential manifestation 
of this relationship. It is thus inevitable that, when this kind of relationship is truly estab-
lished, man becomes obedient to the commandments of Allah, avoiding that which is 
forbidden to him and making his desires conditional on the desires of Allah” (Khan 1992, 
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131). Naturally, it follows from Wahid al-Din Khan’s reading of din that there is no way to 
identify the concept with the idea of the Islamic state and the notion of “political domina-
tion” it is supposed to be based on. “Din stands for “servility in the face of Allah” in the 
most general sense of the term; everything else is nothing but inner manifestations of this 
servility and meaning thereof. Din has nothing to do with the notion of “system” (nizam) 
some people have tried to make use of in order to bring together different theoretical and 
practical aspects of [the Islamic] religion” (Khan 1992, 131). 
Another authoritative scholar to raise objections against the concept of hakimiyya was 
Abul Hasan Nadwi, who, like Wahid al-Din Khan before him, maintained that Mawdudi’s 
political reading of the “four Qur’anic terms” ignored the moral and ethical sides to Is-
lamic religion, reducing it to mere political ideology whose sole aim was to seize political 
power and to build the Islamic state. According to Abul Hasan Nadwi, to such an extent 
was Mawdudi’s mind dimmed by the prevailing terminology peculiar to political science 
(such as “democracy”, “revolution”, and, especially, “system”) that he made it the basis for 
his religious, political doctrine, disregarding the fact that the terms in question were over-
whelmingly the product of Western European political practice, their specific meanings 
conditioned by the features of different historical and cultural environments (Nadwi 1979, 
39–41). “One difference between the followers of those who are trying for the revival of 
Muslims and Islam (through the modernist-Islamist interpretation) and those reformists 
and renewalists who have had a dini and imani training is clear: while the aim of the first 
group is the control of political power, establishment of Islamic state and the organization 
of human life, the objective of the latter is winning the benevolence of God, success in the 
Hereafter, commitment to faith and following the sira of the Prophet” (Zawahir 2008, 81). 
Moreover, Abul Hasan Nadwi appears to be highly skeptical of Mawdudi’s assertion that 
to deny din in its particular legal-political dimension is, in fact, to ascribe associates to Al-
lah (shirk), embodied by the “idols” (tawaghit) of un-Islamic statehood, Western political 
ideologies, and secular culture. “There are, undoubtedly, varied presentments of pagan 
ignorance as, for example, obedience to the powers defying God, or acknowledgement of 
the authority, directives, and laws of an un-godly regime; but these evince merely subser-
vience to the values, principles, and spirit of idolatry, and cannot be equated with the stark 
infidelity displayed in adoring idols or deifying beings other than God. For all these acts 
occupy a secondary place to the matrix of paganism, it would be improper to strike a bal-
ance between the substance and the accidents, the essential and the accessories” (Nadwi 
1979, 55).
Against the background of the entire Islamic scientific community, it is Hasan al-
Hudaybi (1891–1979), the second General Guide (murshid ‘amm) of the “Society of Mus-
lim Brothers”, who stands out as one of the most implacable opponents of Mawdudi. His 
objections to the theory of hakimiyya have been set forth in his book entitled “Preachers 
not Judges” (Du‘at la Qudat). In the words of B. Zollner, “by no means does Du‘at la Qu-
dat question the idea of God’s oneness (tawhid) and its inference that he is the origina-
tor of just and divine rule. Yet, al-Hudaybi abandons the radical position. He sees this 
interpretation [i.e. the doctrine of hakimiyya. — P. V.] as an undifferentiated, reductionist 
understanding of God’s authority…” (Zollner 2009, 150). Hasan al-Hudaybi essentially 
denies hakimiyya its right to exist (Sattar 1995, 15) by claiming that the expression is un-
known to either the Qur’an or sunna. “It is our strong conviction that there is no aya that 
implies the existence of hakimiyya; after having resorted to deep inquiry into the reliable 
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(sahih) ahadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him, we failed to spot a single hadith deal-
ing with this expression” (al-Hudaybi 1977, 75). Apparently, from the viewpoint of Hasan 
al-Hudaybi, Mawdudi’s theory revolved around the belief that if a man was to promulgate 
laws on his own, his attempts at legislation would be nothing but encroachment on “Al-
lah’s domination”. As a response to this tentative theory, al-Hudaybi resolved to promote a 
wider freedom of self-determination as regards legal issues, with his main proposal being 
to differentiate between the unalterable, eternally valid rules of divine law (‘ibadat) and 
the variable rules of practice. According to al-Hudaybi, the rules of ‘ibadat make up the 
Shari‘ah rules found in the Qur’an and sunna. These rules are never subject to change in 
the course of time; hence, they constitute the invariable component of Islamic law. As for 
the other category of rules, which he calls mubahat (“permissible actions”), it is composed 
of changeable laws (Zollner 2009, 151). Although the rules of mubahat may be formulated 
on the basis of the secondary “rational” sources of Islamic law, such as ijma‘4 or qiyas5, it 
is a must that they correspond to the provisions of the Qur’an and sunna. The Islamic law 
should not be regarded as a set of irrevocable normative rules laid down once and for all, 
which was, from al-Hudaybi’s standpoint, the main idea behind Mawdudi’s concept of 
hakimiyya, but rather it should be viewed as a system of flexible legal norms subject to 
changes as time and conditions vary.
The principal objections raised by al-Hudaybi against the theory of hakimiyya appear 
somewhat unfounded as he seems to have failed to differentiate between the “legal domi-
nation” and the “political domination”. Contrary to his assertions, there are no indications 
that Mawdudi ruled out the possibility of legislating independently on issues unresolved 
by the existing rules of Shari‘ah. Moreover, it was his tendency to widen the scope of the 
lawmaker’s discretion as much as possible, which is evident from his seemingly broad 
interpretation of the concept of ijtihad. “Islam does not totally exclude human legislation. 
It only limits its scope and guides it on right lines. The human legislation, according to Is-
lam, is and should be subject to the Supremacy of Divine Law and within limits prescribed 
by it” (Maududi 1960a, 74). 
Certain modern researchers have expressed opinions as regards the concept of ha-
kimiyya that seem to be more grounded. According to these scholars, hukm (lit. Ar. “au-
thority”, “decision”, “legal rule”, “legal injunction”), which is the root term for hakimiyya, 
has never served to denote neither any legal political phenomena nor any kind of politi-
cal authority. In the words of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Sayyid al-‘Ashmawi, “the 
word hukm, in the sense in which it is utilized in the Holy Qur’an, is quite different from 
what it has come to mean in the modern [Arabic] language…As a Qur’anic term, hukm 
linguistically and lexically designates the trial and the settlement of disputes, while it is 
also possible to translate the word as prudence and wisdom. As for the political authority, 
or, to use modern parlance, “government” (al-hukuma), the appropriate Qur’anic word 
would be “order” (al-amr), which is the reason the “ruler” (al-amir), i.e. he who is em-
powered to give orders, is called the way he is” (al-‘Ashmawi 1996, 57–58). Al-‘Ashmawi’s 
view of hukm is shared by Muhammad ‘Imara who is known for rebuking sharply those 
Muslims who, as he claims in his book “The Islamic State between Secularism and Reli-
gious Authority”, “have derived [the term] hakimiyya of Allah, all praise be to Him, from 
4 Ijma‘ is a legal term referring to the consensus of the most authoritative Muslim scholars on a 
particular juridical or legal issue. 
5 Qiyas, or analogical reasoning, constitutes one of the secondary “rational” sources of Islamic law.
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the term hukm, for they believed it to have been used in the Qur’an, and, consequently, by 
the Islamic political thought in general, to indicate political regime and supreme political 
authority, while in fact in most cases the word in question would be used in the Qur’an to 
denote either “trial” or the “settlement of disputes” (‘Imara 1988, 35). Hence, according to 
Muhammad ‘Imara, “hakimiyya has nothing to do with neither caliphate, nor imamate, 
nor what we would call the form of government in our modern political literature” (‘Imara 
1988, 35). 
Among the scholars who reject the political aspect of hakimiyya are those who per-
ceive the concept as a reflection of the Khawarij6 doctrines. For example, the Lebanese 
legal scholar Haydar Ibrahim ‘Ali has alleged that Mawdudi was “the first among those 
working on the theory of hakimiyya in the modern age, that is, after the time the Khawarij 
advanced their famous slogan…that read: “judgment belongs to Allah alone”. Despite the 
fact that the scope of the slogan has been limited in its historical context by certain aims 
and events…its meaning has currently exceeded the limits of the historical court of ar-
bitration, to the point that at present it has come to denote authority and domination in 
full” (‘Ali 2001, 133). Of similar opinion is Muhammad al-Shafi‘i, an Egyptian researcher, 
who believes that “Mawdudi has borrowed the idea of hakimiyya from the Khawarij, ac-
cording to whom it is only Allah who is the creator of the Universe and the supreme ruler 
to whom alone belongs the absolute supreme authority. As concerns a man, he is just a 
deputy (khalifa) of this ruler…tasked with overseeing the application of his laws and ex-
ecuting government policies along the lines of his commandments” (al-Shafi‘i 1999, 66). 
The proponents of the “neo-Khawarij” theory have come under criticism from the 
likes of the Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who is of the opinion that the histori-
cal origins of hakimiyya ought to be traced back to the political manipulations Muawiya 
b. Abu Sufyan, the governor of Syria, resorted to in order to secure victory over his ad-
versaries at the battle of Siffin, with his ultimate aim being to transform the Syrian vicere-
gency into a full-blown independent statehood. “The ideological aspect behind the whole 
arbitration trick becomes clearly visible as soon as we realize that it was used to move the 
struggle away from the prevailing socio-political realm to the realm of religion and nass…
The recourse to nass within the framework of the socio-political struggle has resulted in 
its validity becoming “universal”, with this “universality” reaching the peak of its hege-
mony in the latest religious philosophy, as [the example of] hakimiyya suggests” (Abu 
Zayd 1994, 102).
To top it all, Muhammad Sayyid al-‘Ashmawi, whom we have cited earlier, has de-
nied altogether the very Islamic nature of the concept of hakimiyya. Al-‘Ashmawi traces 
the emergence of the notion of hakimiyya in modern political thought to the influence 
of Judaism and the ideology of Talmud, which he vaguely defines as legal and political 
“Israelisms” (isra’iliyyat). “They say that to fulfil the orders of Allah and to execute His 
hakimiyya is to judge by that which He has sent down, as well as to acknowledge that it 
is only He who is entitled to legislate and to try. I believe that this view…has been heav-
ily influenced by the Judaic thought or, more precisely, by what is known in the Islamic 
thought as “Israelisms”, i.e. multiple Jewish ideas that have managed to infiltrate Islam 
6 The Khawarij (lit. Ar. “those who seceded”) were members of a group of early Muslims who opposed 
the arbitration between the fourth “rightly-guided” caliph ‘Ali b. Abu Talib (599–661) and the governor of 
Syria Muawiya b. Abu Sufyan (603–680) at the battle of Siffin (657 AD). This group is considered the first to 
ever advance the slogan “judgment belongs to Allah alone”. 
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despite being completely alien to it” (al-‘Ashmawi 1996, 53). Al-‘Ashmawi is of opinion 
that, unlike the Pentateuch, which is essentially a product of systematization of the Ju-
daic legal-religious rules, the Qur’anic revelation is largely composed of moral-religious 
injunctions, with the portion of legal rules proper being scarce to the extent that it is only 
with considerable reservation that the very term “law” could be applied to it. Hence, from 
al-‘Ashmawi’s standpoint, “the fusion of the two messages (i.e. Judaism and Islam — P. V.), 
with Islam following in the footsteps of Judaism, alters the very foundation of Islam and 
its central axis, distorting its purport and forcing it to take the shape of “Israelism”, and 
ultimately of Judaism” (al-‘Ashmawi 1996, 55). 
Yet, there are some modern researchers who concede to the possibility that hukm 
could be used in the Qur’an as the term denoting supreme political authority. Foremost 
among these scholars is the Egyptian Hisham Ahmad Ja‘far, who has opined that the term 
could assume political connotations in the Qur’anic phraseology. “Some have denied that 
hukm is used in the Qur’an and sunna as a political term, claiming that it only implies trial 
proceedings (al-qada’) and the settlement of disputes, as well as knowledge and wisdom. 
These [scholars] seem completely oblivious to the fact that for the trial to take place, it is 
necessary that the court ruling (al-hukm) be political in its character, for it is the politi-
cal authority alone that is entitled to enforce court decisions on the parties to a dispute” 
(Ja‘far 1995, 63). Of similar opinion is another Egyptian scholar, Mahmud ‘Akasha, who 
believes that the concept of hakimiyya has nothing to do with the political thought of the 
Khawarij. “Hakimiyya has not originated from the hukm of the Khawarij and the slogans 
they advanced, such as “judgment belongs to Allah alone”, or “it is only Allah who passes 
judgments”, for what a difference there is between the legal dimensions of hakimiyya and 
the Khawarij arbitration! From the perspective of the Khawarij, hukm basically stands for 
trials and the settlement of disputes, while, according to the scholars of usul al-fiqh, the 
term merely indicates that Allah is the only ruler” (‘Akasha 2002, 234). 
3. Conclusion. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the genesis of 
the concept of hakimiyya in the writings of Mawdudi has essentially paved the way for the 
emergence of all the other major trends and tendencies in his subsequent legal-political 
thinking. For instance, as a legal concept, hakimiyya lies at the core of Mawdudi’s theory of 
the Islamic state. One major trait of this theory is that it fails to acknowledge caliphate as a 
medieval form of monarchical rule, or, to use Mawdudi’s terminology, “the caliphate of the 
messenger of Allah”, but rather sees it as a valid, imperative notion of “divine deputyship”, 
that is to say, as an ontological opposite to the very idea of monarchy — the so-called 
“caliphate of Allah”. The doctrine of “divine domination” has played a significant part in 
the development of the specifically Mawdudian theory of sources of Islamic law (usul al-
fiqh) as it has been employed to substantiate his refusal to acknowledge the Islamic nature 
of the Muslim “man-made laws”. On top of that, by equating din to the ultimate Islamic 
statehood, it has become feasible for Mawdudi to make hakimiyya the basis for his theory 
of the “renewal of faith” (tajdid al-din) and the concept of “Islamic revolution”. At pres-
ent, despite being heavily criticized on the part of the Islamic academic community, the 
doctrine of hakimiyya remains the mainstay among the adherents of a number of Islamic 
political movements that harbor extremist leanings. It is thus possible to conclude that the 
concept of hakimiyya should be counted among the most important doctrinal innovations 
the Islamic legal-political thought owes to Mawdudi. 
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